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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how changes in the tax structure may affect Indonesia’s long-run economic 
growth. The growth effects of the mix of income taxes and consumption taxes are examined using a 
set of panel growth regressions, which account for indicators of the tax structure, as well as both the 
accumulation of physical capital and human capital. The results suggest that income taxes may not 
exert a statistically significant impact on long-run growth, while consumption taxes may have a 
positive and statistically significant impact. These results, however, are not robust to changes in the 
regression’s specifications. Hence, although previous studies predict that the mix of direct and indirect 
taxes may be an important determinant of long-run growth, this paper provides evidence that, in 
practice, this mix is unlikely to have an impact on the long-run economic growth of Indonesia. It is 
suggested that policymakers could instead focus their attentions on directing tax reform in Indonesia 
toward improving tax administration and the equity of the tax system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, efforts to reform Indonesia’s taxation 
system have begun. Several proposals have been 
introduced, and one of them recommends a shift 
in the main burden of revenue away from 
income taxes toward consumption taxes. This 
proposal, if accepted, may result in changes in 
the structure of taxation. With this background, 
this paper examines how changes in the tax 
structure may affect Indonesia’s long-run 
economic growth, based on the available 
empirical data.1 
Major tax reform in Indonesia was first 
enacted in 1983 against the backdrop of 
declining government revenue from the oil and 
gas sector. Aimed at diversifying the economy 
away from its heavy dependence on oil 
revenues, as the single engine of prosperity, the 
government devised an ‘exit strategy’, in which 
the main emphasis was to promote market-based 
production structures as the new engines of 
economic growth (Prawiro, 1998; Usui, 1997). 
This exit strategy called for broad-based 
economic reforms which, among others, affected 
the tax system. 
The tax reform depicts a sharp departure 
from the previous tax system, which was 
adopted since independence in 1945. The old tax 
system was argued to be riddled with defects 
because it was primarily based on outdated 
legislation, left from more than three centuries of 
Dutch colonial administration (Gillis, 1989). 
Before the reform of 1983, efforts to fix these 
defects were generally unsuccessful, since they 
were frequently directed to fine tune the tax 
system for nonrevenue goals such as industrial 
growth, income redistribution, and regional 
development. The result was an unusually 
complex maze of amendments, decrees, and 
regulations which made the tax system virtually 
                                                 
1  This study limits its discussions only to those taxes 
administered by the central government of Indonesia. 
unenforceable, if not incomprehensible. Thus, 
the old tax system could not generate sufficient 
revenue, as well as causing substantial economic 
inefficiencies and inequity (Gillis, 1989). 
One of the crucial features in the reform of 
1983 was a shift to self-assessment by taxpayers, 
from the previous, decades-old tradition of an 
official assessment of tax liabilities. This move 
was deemed fundamental in the effort to reduce 
the frequency of direct contact between tax 
officials and taxpayers, thus lessening the 
opportunities for collusion. Further, it was 
expected that the move toward self-assessment 
would allow for more and better audits of cases 
promising high revenue payoffs, through 
reductions in the routine workload of tax 
officials. 
Another significant feature of the reform of 
1983 was the introduction of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) to replace the old sales tax. Due to a high 
degree of rate differentiation (there were eight 
tax rates, ranging from 1% to 20%) and a 
complex structure of exemptions, the sales tax 
generated low levels of revenue (Gillis, 1989). 
The new VAT was intended to be a levy on 
consumption, using a creditable method of 
collection, based on destination principle and 
imposed at a uniform 10rcent rate. At the time of 
its enactment, the VAT was expected to be able 
to contribute at least 60% of the incremental 
revenues gained from the reform.  
In the area of income taxes, prior to the 
reform, taxation on the income generated a poor 
revenue performance, and this condition was 
partly the result of defects in the regulations and 
partly as a result of poor administration (Gillis, 
1989). Within the old system, large chunks of 
individual income were untaxed or lightly taxed. 
For example, interest income was untaxed even 
though interest expenses were deductible. 
Further, there were erosions in the income tax 
base due to overly generous incentives for 
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foreign and domestic firms (although these 
incentives were largely unsuccessful in attracting 
a significant flow of investment). The reform of 
1983 sharply limited the availability of tax 
incentives, while at the same time reducing the 
tax rate. These measures were taken with the 
intention to broaden the tax base.  
The original laws contained in the reform of 
1983 have undergone several amendments 
during the subsequent reforms of 1994, 2000, 
and 2008. These amendments, however, are not 
significant and generally involve changes in the 
nominal values (such as changes in the minimum 
threshold for taxable income in order to keep 
pace with inflation), as well as changes in tax 
rates. Other changes involve editorial modifi-
cations which seem to be aimed at making the 
laws clearer and less ambiguous. Thus, the 
basics of the tax systems established under the 
reform of 1983 are largely intact.  
The mix of various direct and indirect taxes 
in Indonesia has evolved over time and their 
revenue performance, as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) over the period 1972-
2015 is presented in Figure 1. 
Data in Figure 1 show that prior to the 
reform of 1983, the revenue from income taxes 
reached its highest level at the peak of the oil 
boom in 1981 when it reached 18.5% of GDP. 
After the end of the oil boom era, however, the 
trend declined. This decline continued after the 
reform and the lowest level was reached in 2007, 
with income taxes revenue only reaching 2.7% 
of GDP. Thus, it seems that the reform of 1983 
(and the subsequent reforms) have not been able 
to generate a stable revenue from income taxes. 
This declining trend may partly be explained by 
administrative problems (see Brondolo, Silvani, 
Le Borgne, & Bosch, 2008) and partly due to the 
existence of various tax incentive schemes (see 
Wells, Allen, Morisset, & Pirnia, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1. Revenues from income taxes, consumption taxes, and international trade taxes 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017)
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On the other hand, revenue from 
consumption taxes shows a generally increasing 
trend, although its slope is much flatter than the 
declining slope of income taxes. In other words, 
increasing revenue from consumption taxes has 
not been able to offset the declining revenue 
from income taxes. The highest ratio of 
consumption taxes revenue to GDP was reached 
in 1994, at 6.2% of GDP. Although this was not 
enough to cover the declining income taxes 
revenue, at least VAT has been able to lessen the 
adverse impact of the end of the oil boom era on 
government balance sheets. In fact, in the early 
years following the reform of 1983, Gillis (1989, 
p. 110) – as the organizer and director of the 
technical expatriate team for Indonesian tax 
reform – argued that the reform would be 
marked as a failure if not for the revenue success 
of VAT.  
Further, Gillis (1989) maintained that this 
success could be attributed to, firstly, the 
simplification of VAT structures and procedures 
and, secondly, the collection of VAT through 
several choke points in the economy: the state 
oil company, customs house, and state-owned 
companies. Since the reform of 1983 the VAT 
rate has not changed, it has consistently been 
levied at 10%.2 
Data on the performance of total tax 
revenues show a persistent decline in the ratio of 
tax revenue to GDP. Figure 2 exhibits time 
series data on tax revenues, as a percentage of 
GDP over the period 1984-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2. Tax revenues as percentage of GDP (1984-2015) 
Source: 2World Development Indicators (2017) 
 
                                                 
2  Revenue from taxes on international trade is not significant as a percentage of GDP and its trend is declining. This decline 
is generally consistent with the declining tariff barriers (see Basri & Patunru, 2012). 
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As shown in Figure 2, from 1984 until 
before the start of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, the average tax ratio was 16.1%. In the 
period 1998-2004, the average tax ratio declined 
to 13.5%. Nevertheless, it should also be noted 
that this was a period of political and economic 
instability following the Asian financial crisis. In 
the period 2005-2015, political and economic 
stability was generally achieved. However, the 
tax ratio declined further, to an average of only 
11.6%. 
The top income tax rates have also changed 
considerably since the reform. Figure 3 presents 
the top income tax rates since 1984. For the 
period 1984-1994, the top rate for corporate 
income tax was 35%, which then decreased to 
30% until 2000, it then further decreased to 28% 
for the 2009 tax year, and since the 2010 tax 
year, the top rate has stayed at 25%. For 
individual taxpayers, the top rate was 35% for 
the 1984-1994 tax years, 30% for 1995-2000, 
35% for 2001-2008 and 30%  since 2009. 
Previous empirical research on the relation 
between taxation and economic growth provides 
mixed results. On the one hand, studies found 
that taxes may hamper economic growth. 
Empirical research supporting this notion can be 
found, among others, in the works of Barro and 
Redlick (2011); Dahlby and Ferede (2012); 
Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2011); Mertens 
and Ravn (2013). These studies generally point 
to the adverse effects of taxes on economic 
output and growth. On the other hand, other 
studies found that taxes do not affect economic 
growth, or that the effects of taxes on growth 
depend on the type of the tax imposed: i.e., non-
distortionary taxes do not impede growth and 
vice-versa. This strand of literature can be found 
in the empirical works of, for instance, 
Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2014); Katz, 
Mahler, and Franz (1983); Widmalm (2001); 
Worlu and Nkoro (2012). 
 
 
Figure 3. Top rates for income tax 
Source: Indonesia Government (2008) 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Neoclassical and Endogenous Growth 
Theories: an Overview 
The building block of the growth theory is the 
proposition that sustaining positive, long-run 
growth in output per capita requires perpetual 
progress in technological knowledge, in the form 
of new markets, goods, or processes (Aghion, 
Howitt, Brant-Collett, & García-Peñalosa, 
1998). Within the neoclassical growth theory, 
this proposition may best be demonstrated using 
the model developed by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956). Their model shows that without 
technological progress, economic growth would 
cease to exist when diminishing returns start to 
kick in. 
The standard neoclassical growth model 
could be expressed as ܻ = ܭఈܮଵିఈܣ݁ఓ, where ܻ 
denotes economic output (GDP), ܭ is the stock 
of capital, ܮ is the stock of labor, ܣ is a constant 
which represents the initial state of technology in 
the economy, ߙ represents capital’s share in the 
total value of output, and ݁ఓ represents the rate 
of change in technological advances which is 
assumed to be exogenous (Solow, 1956). In this 
model, increases in the stock of capital will spur 
additional growth in output for a time. However, 
as the ratio of capital to labor increases the 
marginal product of capital will eventually 
decrease and the economy will evolve back to a 
steady state. In this steady state, the rate of 
growth of output, capital stock, and labor will be 
the same; hence the rate of growth of income per 
worker will be equal with the rate of growth of ߤ 
– i.e., the rate of growth in productivity. Since 
technological progress in the neoclassical growth 
model is assumed to be exogenous, the model 
does not specify the determinants of the size of ߤ 
(Pack, 1994). 
The endogenous growth theory seeks to 
redress the determinants of the growth rate of 
productivity (ߤ) which is left unexplained within 
the neoclassical model. The crux of the 
endogenous growth theory can be formulated as 
ܻ = ܣܭ	(Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991; Romer, 
1986). Here, ܣ represents various factors that 
affect technological progress, while ܭ	denotes 
both human and physical capital. Diminishing 
returns to capital are absent from the endogenous 
model since they are assumed to be able to be 
averted through the invocation of some 
externality that counteracts any proclivity toward 
diminishing returns. According to this model, 
increases in productivity can be achieved 
through investments in physical and human 
capitals. Investment increases in the variety or 
quality of machinery, or the intermediate input 
for example, would be able to halt and reverse 
any tendency toward diminishing returns. In this 
respect, investments in research and develop-
ment as well as improvements in the skills of the 
labor force are crucial to sustain long-run 
economic growth. 
Within the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth theories, the relation between economic 
growth and taxation may be straightforward. 
Taxes may reduce the returns to savings, and 
thus may discourage the accumulation of capital 
stock. Similarly, since taxes may reduce the 
reward for work, they may reduce labors’ work 
efforts and thus depress the supply of labor. 
Reductions in the accumulation of capital stock 
and the supply of labor may result in lower 
economic output and growth. By the same token, 
to secure profitable innovations, corporations 
expend resources on research and development; 
thus taxes may affect the optimal amount 
corporations are willing to spend on these 
activities. To develop human capital and 
increase lifetime earnings, individuals invest in 
education, and since taxes may reduce the 
returns to education, they also may reduce the 
accumulation of human capital (Myles, 2007). 
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Arnold (2008) argued that all taxes – except 
lump-sum taxes – create distortions which could 
affect economic growth. Arnold (2008) argued 
further that the degree of distortion of tax 
systems depends on two factors: the number of 
resources extracted from private agents (i.e. the 
tax levels) and the ways different taxes are 
combined to raise revenue (i.e. the tax 
structures).  
On the other hand, there are positive aspects 
of taxation. Some public expenditure – which, 
among others, are financed by tax revenue – can 
indirectly contribute to increases in economic 
growth (Khan & Reinhart, 1990; Myles, 2009). 
Positive externalities from the provision of 
public goods such as education, infrastructure 
and health care may increase the marginal 
productivity of capital and this would lead to 
higher economic output (Caballé & Panadés, 
1997; Ercolani & e Azevedo, 2014). 
2. Taxes and Economic Growth 
The general problem of taxation may relate to a 
large number of economic agents with different 
characteristics of endowments and tastes 
(Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1976). If the tax authority 
could acquire complete information on these 
characteristics at no cost to itself, a tax could 
simply be imposed on a lump-sum basis, with a 
differing amount according to the characteristics 
of each economic agent. It is due to the 
difficulties associated with obtaining this 
information which forces taxes to be imposed 
based on certain surrogate characteristics. The 
use of these surrogates, however, give rise to 
several problems, one of them is the economic 
distortions created because an economic agent, 
to some extent, controls many of the 
characteristics which may be used for the 
surrogate and these distortions may affect the 
performance of the economy. 
Empirical studies on the link between the 
levels of taxes and economic growth, however, 
have led to inconclusive results. Furthermore, 
the direction of causality may be difficult to 
determine, even though correlations between 
these two variables may be able to be robustly 
identified. Results have ranged from the finding 
of a robust and significant correlation between 
the tax level and growth, such as suggested by, 
for example, Barro (1989), Miller and Russek 
(1997) and Romer and Romer (2010), to the 
finding of a weak and fragile relation between 
the two, as suggested by, among others, Koester 
and Kormendi (1989), Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) and Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti, and Asea 
(1997). 
Barro (1989) used data on growth, 
investment, population, and a proxy for human 
capital from 72 countries, and found that public 
spending (and, implicitly, the taxes that finance 
this spending) affected economic growth and 
investment. Further, consumptive public 
spending was found to be negatively correlated 
with growth and investment, while public 
investment spending had a positive relation with 
growth and private investment. From a sample 
of several developed and developing countries, 
Miller and Russek (1997) concluded that 
government expenditure which was financed by 
tax increases might encourage or impede growth, 
depending on the category of expenditure. 
Specifically, education expenditure was found to 
be the only category which had a positive impact 
on economic growth. Romer and Romer (2010) 
reviewed U.S. federal tax changes since World 
War II and examined the behavior of the 
economic output following these changes. One 
of the crucial findings in the work of Romer and 
Romer (2010) was that increases in the level of 
taxation significantly hampered economic 
growth.  
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Koester and Kormendi (1989) examined the 
effects of average and marginal tax rates on the 
rate of growth and the level of economic activity 
from a sample of 63 countries. They found that 
tax rates only weakly related to economic 
growth, while reductions in marginal tax rates 
could be associated with increases in the level of 
per capita income. Another cross-country study 
by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found that 
marginal tax rates have a statistically 
insignificant correlation with growth. Examining 
a time-series panel of 18 OECD countries, 
Mendoza et al. (1997) concluded that effective 
tax rates on factor incomes and consumption 
were not effective in altering long-run economic 
growth. 
Hungerford (2012) investigated changes to 
the top marginal tax rate in the United States 
over the past 65 years and how they may affect 
economic growth. Empirical results of his study 
suggested that growth appeared to be unaffected 
by changes in the tax rate over the period under 
study. Further, Hungerford (2012, p. 16) 
concluded that “the reduction in the top tax rates 
appears to be uncorrelated with saving, 
investment, and productivity growth. The top tax 
rates appear to have little or no relation to the 
size of the economic pie.” 
Using a sample from 70 countries covering 
the period 1970-1997, Lee and Gordon (2005) 
studied how tax rates affected the rates of 
economic growth in these countries. Controlling 
for various determinants of economic growth, 
they found that the economic growth rates of the 
countries being studied were significantly 
negatively correlated with the levels of the 
corporate tax rate. They also found, however, 
that economic growth rates have insignificant 
correlations with the average tax rate on labor 
income, and the effective overall marginal tax 
rates. Their study suggested that the annual rate 
of economic growth could be increased by 1 to 
2% points by cutting the corporate tax rate by 
10% points. 
Similarly, empirical studies which examined 
the link between economic growth and tax 
structures (rather than tax levels) also provide 
inconclusive results. Kneller, Bleaney, and 
Gemmell (1999) studied data from 22 developed 
countries covering the period 1970-1995, and in 
their study taxes were classified as distortionary 
(i.e., taxes on income and property) and non-
distortionary (i.e., consumption taxes). They 
suggested that the empirical evidence seemed to 
support the notion that distortionary taxation 
impeded growth, while non-distortionary 
taxation aided growth. Widmalm (2001) found 
evidence from the cross-sectional data of 23 
OECD countries, for the period 1965-1990, that 
the proportion of personal income tax in the total 
tax revenue was negatively correlated with 
economic growth. Widmalm (2001) also found 
some evidence that consumption tax was growth 
enhancing and argued that this was due to the 
relatively less harmful nature of consumption tax 
on economic growth, compared to other taxes. 
Using industry-level data from a set of 
OECD countries, Vartia (2008) examined the 
effects of taxation on investment and 
productivity. Vartia (2008) found evidence that 
the corporate tax rate was negatively correlated 
with investment, while productivity responded 
negatively to the corporate and top personal 
income taxes. Johansson, Heady, Arnold, Brys, 
and Vartia (2008) and Arnold et al. (2011) 
studied how GDP per capita in OECD countries 
could be affected by changes in tax structures. 
Empirical results of their studies suggested that 
different types of taxes may affect long-run GDP 
per capita differently. They ranked various types 
of tax instruments from the least distortive to the 
most distortive as follows: recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, consumption taxes, 
personal income taxes, and corporate income 
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taxes. Based on these results, they argued that 
shifting part of the revenue base from income 
taxes to less distortive types of taxes might be 
necessary when tax reform was intended to be 
growth-oriented. They argued, however, that 
increasing taxes on property, though less 
distortive, tended to be politically unpopular; 
thus revenue shifts toward consumption taxes 
were suggested as being more practical. 
On the other hand, other empirical studies 
found that the structures of taxes have a weak 
effect on long-run economic growth. Harberger 
(1964a, 1964b) maintained that, in the long run, 
tax policy is ineffective as an instrument to alter 
the rate of economic growth. In support of this, 
Harberger (1964a) pointed to the fact that in the 
United States, large changes in the tax structure 
have no effect on the rate of growth of savings 
and output. Further, within the framework of 
growth accounting, Harberger (1964b) found 
that long-run economic growth was not affected 
by changes in the mix of direct and indirect 
taxes. Harberger (1964b) maintained that this 
mix had negligible effects on the growth rates of 
the labor supply and labor’s income share, as 
well as limited effects on the rates of savings and 
investment. Hence, Harberger proposed that tax 
policy is ‘superneutral’ – it would not affect the 
long-run rate of economic growth, although it 
may affect the rate of investment and enhance 
welfare by way of some efficiency gains. 
Mendoza et al. (1997) examined the effects 
of tax policy within the framework of 
endogenous growth models, which included 
human capital accumulation as a driver of 
economic growth. Their study found that the 
effects of tax structures on economic growth are 
highly dependent on the regression 
specifications used in the models, and the 
empirical evidence of their study showed 
negligible growth effects from taxes. This result 
is principally consistent with Harberger’s 
conjecture. Using quarterly data from the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Poterba, 
Rotemberg, and Summers (1986) examined how 
changes in the mix of direct and indirect taxes 
affected economic performance. They found 
that, in the short run, shifts from direct taxation 
toward indirect taxation increased after-tax 
wages and prices and reduced real output, while 
in the long run there is no significant effect 
which could be observed as a result of these 
shifts.  
Similarly, in an empirical model based on 
data from 22 OECD countries, Madsen and 
Damania (1996) investigated the macroecono-
mic effects of switching the tax burden from 
direct to indirect taxes. Their study found that a 
revenue-neutral switch from direct to indirect 
taxes has no impact on the long-run level of 
economic activity in the majority of countries in 
the sample. They argued, however, that this 
switch may generate efficiency gains and may 
lead to higher levels of aggregate output in the 
short run. In a more recent study, Acosta 
Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) examined panel data 
from 69 countries and found that while tax 
structures affect economic growth in high and 
middle-income countries, they did not find 
strong evidence on the significance of the impact 
of changes in tax structures on the economic 
growth of low-income countries. Thus the 
literature may suggest that although theory 
predicts that tax policy is an important 
determinant of economic growth, certain 
empirical evidence shows that it may be unlikely 
to affect long-run economic growth. 
For the case of Indonesia, Simarangkir and 
Nakamura (2010) studied how GDP was 
affected by direct and indirect taxes for the 
period 1970-2008, using a demand-side macro-
econometric model. They found that both types 
of taxes negatively affected GDP, with the larger 
effect coming from direct taxes. This paper 
Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2018 225 
reexamines these hypotheses by investigating the 
way different types of taxes are combined and 
designed to generate revenues and their relation 
to Indonesia’s long-run economic growth from 
the perspective of supply-side economics. 
Further, it enriches the available literature on the 
Indonesian economy and public finance through 
its one crucial feature: estimations of all the 
specifications, are exercised under a ‘govern-
ment budget constraint’ – that is, a reduction in 
one tax instrument is assumed to be followed by 
increases in the other tax instruments, in order to 
maintain the same levels of revenue. 
This paper focuses its attention only on 
Indonesia, because in cross-country studies there 
are several limitations that need to be raised, 
despite the analytical rigor and meticulous 
attention to detail these cross-country studies 
could provide. Firstly, conceptual and statistical 
problems could arise by grouping several 
countries together, due to the country-specific 
socio-economic differences (Crafts, 1996; 
Levine & Zervos, 1993; Taylor, 2007). 
Secondly, due to the broad exogenous 
differences across countries (such as the 
differences in human capital, government policy, 
and natural resources) estimating the factors 
affecting the rates of economic growth in several 
countries altogether may not be appropriate 
(Quah, 1993).  
METHOD, DATA AND ANALYSIS  
Within the framework of neoclassical growth 
models, such as in the works of Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956), long-run economic growth 
depends only on the accumulation of capital, 
labor and the way with which these two-factor 
inputs are used productively. Tax or any other 
policies have no direct role in this class of 
models. The effects of changes in tax structures 
on economic growth are implicitly assumed to 
materialize in the transitional period when the 
economy moves toward a new equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, the span of time for such 
transitions is not clear, and it could take decades 
for an economy to reach a new equilibrium when 
one considers the sizeable adjustment costs for 
capital stocks or labors’ education (Arnold, 
2008). A different perspective, however, is 
offered by endogenous growth models, such as 
in the work of Lucas (1988). In these models 
policies and institutions serve as drivers which 
can directly affect the long-run rate of economic 
growth. 
Hence, empirical works on economic growth 
are largely divided between exogenous and 
endogenous models of growth, because the 
literature provides no consensus on the 
theoretical framework (Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
For this reason and following the works of 
Arnold (2008) as well as Arnold, Bassanini, and 
Scarpetta (2007), this paper derived its empirical 
specification by combining both models – from 
the Solow-Swan type of augmented model and 
the Lucas (1988) type of endogenous model. 
The approach here starts from the 
assumption that aggregate production is of the 
Cobb-Douglas type, where the output is modeled 
as a function of physical capital, human capital, 
labor and the efficiency with which they act 
together. Hence, production at time ݐ can be 
expressed as: 
௧ܻ = ܭ௧ఈܪ௧ఉ(ܣ௧ܮ௧)ଵିఈିఉ (1) 
In Equation (1) ܻ, ܭ, ܪ and ܮ	are output, 
physical capital, human capital, and labor, 
respectively. ܣ is the level of economic 
efficiency and technological progress (assuming 
constant returns to scale) and is viewed as being 
able to be broken down into two components: 
First, institutional and public policy variables 
which affect economic efficiency and will be 
denoted by the vector ܸ. Second, the level of 
technological progress which is assumed as 
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purely exogenous, and merely a function of time. 
ߙ and ߚ denote the partial elasticity of output 
with respect to physical capital and human 
capital, respectively; whereas ݐ denotes time.  
Hence, Equation (1) can be stated in 
logarithmic growth form as follows: 
∆lny୧,୲ = bଵ,୧∆lns୧,୲୏ + bଶ,୧∆lnh୧,୲ +  
			ܾଷ,௜∆݊௜,௧ +෍ ௝ܾ,௜
௠
௝ୀସ
∆݈݊ ௜ܸ,௧௝ + 
          τ୧t + ε୧୲  (2) 
where ݕ denotes output while ݏ௄, ℎ and ݊ denote 
the stock of physical capital, the stock of human 
capital, and working age population, respec-
tively. ݐ and ߝ denote the function of time and 
the error term, respectively; whereas ܾ denotes 
the coefficient of variable ݅. ߬ denotes the level 
of exogenous technological progress, and is 
assumed to be only a function of time. ܸ 
represents various institutional and public policy 
variables (particularly the variables of taxes) 
which will be interchangeably inserted into the 
regression models.  
The arrangement of ܸ as a vector in 
Equation (2) allows for the convenient 
evaluation of different tax policy reforms under 
the assumption of revenue neutrality: i.e., a 
reduction in one tax instrument is assumed to be 
followed by increases in another tax instrument. 
For example, the variable of income taxes could 
be dropped out of the equation and the 
coefficient of the variable of goods and services 
taxes could be interpreted as the long-run effects 
on economic growth, if the tax reform were to 
rely more heavily on the goods and services 
taxes, while adjusting the level of income taxes 
so as to keep total tax revenues constant (Arnold, 
2008). 
Since Equation (2) is based on the endoge-
nous growth theory, the classical assumptions 
applied to the endogenous model, in general, are 
also applicable for the equation. One of the basic 
assumptions is that the rate of savings is 
assumed to be constant and exogenous. Another 
assumption is that diminishing returns to scale 
are not exhibited in the model with the rationale, 
among others, that capital investment produces 
positive spillovers to the whole economy, and 
that technological improvements may lead to 
further improvements, for example through the 
process of learning by doing.3 
Data on ݕ are compiled from Indonesia’s 
GDP, available from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (2017). The levels of 
gross saving in the economy and the index of 
human capital are used as proxies for ݏ௄ and ℎ, 
respectively. Data on gross savings are collected 
from the World Development Indicators, while 
data on the index of human capital are from the 
Penn World Table (2017).4 Data on population 
are from the World Development Indicators. 
This dataset covers the number of people 
between the ages of 15 to 64. This classification 
is deemed necessary as people between these 
ages are considered to be the productive 
workforce; hence the stock of working age 
population is important for economic growth. 
Data on ௧ܸconsist of the central government’s 
revenue from three major sources: taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains; taxes on 
goods and services; and taxes on international 
trade. These tax revenue data are from the World 
Development Indicators. Considering the 
constraints of data availability, all data cover the 
period 1984-20155. Current values are adjusted 
                                                 
3  Further exploration on the assumptions employed in the 
endogenous model are discussed in the works of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004); Paul M Romer (1994), among 
others. 
4  These data are the contribution of Feenstra, Inklaar, and 
Timmer (2015). 
5  Some missing data are estimated using moving averages 
of the previous five years. 
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to constant 2010 prices using the GDP deflator 
from the World Development Indicators. 
This study limits its scope by focusing on the 
period from 1984-2015 (n=32). This limited 
sample is due to the availability of data because 
tax reform in Indonesia only started around 30 
years ago (in 1984); previously the tax law 
adopted the Dutch colonial tax systems. Further, 
there is a lack of published data on quarterly tax 
revenues; thus the study uses the available yearly 
data. 
1. Hypotheses Development 
The model expressed in Equation (2) suggests 
the relation between economic output on one 
side and the stock of physical capital, the stock 
of human capital, working-age population, and 
various tax instruments on the other side. Since 
௧ܸ in the regression specification in Equation (2) 
includes the sum of revenues across several tax 
instruments, it would face the problem of 
government budget constraints – that is, in order 
to maintain revenue neutrality a change in the 
revenue collected from one tax instrument would 
affect the amount of revenue which needs to be 
collected from the remaining tax instruments 
(Kneller et al., 1999). Following Arnold (2008), 
this constraint would be dealt with by omitting 
one or more tax instruments at a time. The 
omitted elements would be assumed as residuals, 
which could be raised (reduced) following 
decreases (increases) in other tax instruments 
specified in the model, to maintain the same 
levels of tax revenue. Thus the omitted tax 
instruments could be thought of as elements left 
free to close the system. 
Based on the model, there are three null 
hypotheses, formulated as follows: 
H01: Income taxes do not affect economic 
growth.  
This hypothesis is used to explore the impact 
of shifts in the burden of revenue toward taxes 
on income, profits, and capital gains while 
treating taxes on goods and services and taxes on 
international trade as residuals, which functions 
to maintain the total tax revenues. Figure 4 
summarizes the relationship between the 
variables. 
 
 
Figure 4. A conceptual framework of Income Taxes – GDP 
Source: Author 
Physical Capital 
Human Capital 
Population 
Tax Burden 
GDP 
Taxes on Income, Profits, 
& Capital Gains 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
Taxes on Goods 
& Services 
Taxes on 
International Trade 
228 Iswahyudi 
H02:  Consumption taxes do not affect economic 
growth.  
This hypothesis is employed to study the 
impact of shifts in the burden of revenue toward 
taxes on goods and services while treating taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains and taxes on 
international trade as residuals, which functions 
to maintain total tax revenues. Figure 5 depicts 
this relationship between the variables. 
H03:  International trade taxes do not affect 
economic growth.  
This hypothesis is applied to examine the 
impact of shifts in the burden of revenue toward 
international trade taxes while treating taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains and taxes on 
goods and services as residuals, which functions 
to maintain total tax revenues. Figure 6 depicts 
this relationship between the variables. 
 
 
Figure 5. A conceptual framework of Consumption Taxes – GDP 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A conceptual framework of Taxes on International Trade – GDP 
Source: Author 
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All of the above-mentioned hypotheses are 
stated in non-directional forms because this 
study limits its explorations on whether these 
various tax instruments have (or do not have) a 
significant impact on economic growth. It does 
not explore which tax instrument has a higher 
impact on economic growth – an aspect where 
directional forms of hypotheses could be 
employed and thus could be set as a focus for 
further studies. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 presents the empirical results of 
growth’s regression, adding taxes as independent 
variables. Omitted tax instruments are presented 
in the bottom line and assumed to absorb any 
changes in revenue from the tax instrument 
included in the regression, hence maintaining 
revenue neutrality. Across the specifications, the 
overall tax burden does not seem to exert a 
statistically significant effect on economic 
growth. Nevertheless, this element is essential as 
a control variable, hence subsequent analyses 
will retain its presence in the regression 
specifications. 
In the baseline model, it seems that only 
physical capital has consistently positive and 
significant effects on long-run GDP growth 
across the three specifications presented in 
column (1) to column (3). The variable of human 
capital has negative coefficients across the three 
specifications; however, one cannot make too 
much of this negative sign. At best, all that can 
be said is that human capital does not seem to 
exert any significant effects on the long-run rate 
of economic growth. The coefficient of 
population growth shows the correct signs across 
Table 1. Growth regression 
Dependent Variable: GDP (1) (2)  (3) 
Baseline Model 
Physical Capital 0.07 ** 0.08 *** 0.07 ** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Human Capital -0.01 -0.01 -0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population 0.05 0.04 0.05 * 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Control Variable 
Overall Tax Burden 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Total revenues/GDP) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tax Structure Variables 
Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains 0.03
(0.03)
Taxes on Goods and Services 0.04 * 
(0.02)
Taxes on International Trade 0.00
(0.02)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.09   0.15   0.03   
Observations 32   32   32   
Revenue neutrality achieved by adjusting 
Taxes on Goods & 
Services; Taxes 
on Int'l Trade 
Taxes on Income, 
Profits & Cap. 
Gains; Taxes on 
Int'l Trade 
Taxes on Income, 
Profits & Cap. 
Gains; Taxes on 
Goods & Services 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
Sources: Secondary Data, analyzed 
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the specifications; excepting when the main 
burden of revenue is switched to international 
taxes – as shown in column 3 – then population 
growth becomes a significant explanatory 
variable for economic growth. 
Column (1) examines the impact on long-run 
GDP of a hypothetical tax reform which shifts 
the burden of revenue toward taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains, while reduces the 
revenue collected from taxes on goods and 
services and taxes on international trade. The 
estimated coefficient suggests a positive but 
statistically insignificant effect of income taxes 
on GDP. Further, a coefficient of 0.07 for the 
independent variable of physical capital might 
suggest that a 1% change in the growth of capital 
stock – holding the other independent variables 
unchanged – would translate into a 0.07% 
change in the rate of growth of GDP. 
Assuming statistically significant results, the 
coefficients for the other independent variables 
in column (1) could be interpreted as follows: A 
coefficient of 0.05 for the variable of population 
might suggest that a 1% growth in the number of 
people between the ages 15 to 64 would change 
the rate of GDP growth by 0.05%. A coefficient 
of 0.00 for the variable of the overall tax burden 
might suggest that a 1% growth in the ratio of 
tax revenues to GDP would translate into a 
0.00% change in GDP growth. While a 
coefficient of 0.03 for the variable of taxes on 
income, profits, and capital gains could be 
interpreted as a 1% change in the growth of 
revenues collected from taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains might change the growth rate 
of GDP by 0.03%. 
In column (2), the burden of revenue is 
shifted toward taxes on goods and services while 
reducing the revenue collected from taxes on 
income and taxes on international trade. The 
result shows that taxes on consumption have 
positive and significant effects on the long-run 
growth rate of GDP. A coefficient of 0.08 for the 
independent variable of physical capital might 
suggest that a 1% change in the growth of capital 
stock would translate into a 0.08% change in the 
growth of GDP. A coefficient of 0.04% for the 
variable of taxes on goods and services might 
suggest that a 1% change in the growth of 
revenue from the taxes on goods and services 
might translate into a 0.04% change in GDP 
growth. 
Reducing taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains as well as taxes on goods and 
services while shifting the burden of revenue 
toward taxes on international trade, as shown in 
column (3), does not seem to exert any effect on 
GDP. In this specification, the association 
between taxes on international trade and long-
run GDP is negligible (zero) and not statistically 
significant. The variable of the population, 
however, becomes statistically significant with a 
coefficient of 0.05 – meaning that it can be 
inferred with some degree of confidence that a 
1% growth in the number of people between the 
ages of 15 to 64 might change the GDPs growth 
rate by 0.05%. 
Bringing together the results in columns (1) 
to (3), it seems that it is only consumption taxes 
which have statistically significant effects on 
economic growth. The positive coefficient of 
this instrument may be interpreted that tax 
reform, which is financed by shifting the burden 
of revenue toward consumption taxes while 
reducing revenue from income taxes and 
international taxes, would have a positive impact 
on economic growth. 
Theoretically, one of the possible explana-
tions for the significant effects of consumption 
taxes on economic growth, relative to other tax 
instruments (especially the income taxes), might 
have to do with the relative neutrality of 
consumption taxes toward economic agents’ 
decisions on savings and investment, 
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consumption, production, and the labor supply 
(James, 2015). Consumption taxes may be 
neutral to savings and investment decisions 
because under a consumption tax the returns 
from savings are not the base for the tax’s 
imposition (James, 2015). Hence, this may spur 
the accumulation of capital stock. Income taxes, 
on the other hand, may adversely affect savings 
and investment decisions, since they allegedly 
tax the returns from savings twice – once at the 
firm’s level when it makes a profit and once 
again when dividends are shared to shareholders 
(Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, & Summers, 2001).  
Furthermore, consumption taxes could 
stimulate capital accumulation through their 
neutrality toward consumption decisions, since 
they do not interfere with the consumers’ 
decisions to consume now or later. Under an 
income tax, economic agents are likely to be 
discouraged from future consumption (hence, it 
discourages saving) since the use of income as a 
tax base tends to favor current consumption 
(Shalizi & World Bank Group, 1991). 
Consumption taxes, on the contrary, do not 
distort the choice of current and future 
consumption, since both will be taxed uniformly. 
In this way, consumption taxes do not penalize 
capital accumulation, and this would stimulate 
economic growth (Gillis, Shoup, & Sicat, 1990). 
The neutrality of consumption taxes could 
also encourage economic output since they 
would not interfere with agents’ decisions 
regarding production. Businesses would have the 
incentive to use less capital-intensive production 
methods if capital was taxed (which could be 
applied under an income tax system), this would 
make the relative prices of capital-intensive 
goods rise (Ebrill et al., 2001). Under a 
consumption tax, businesses would be free to 
choose the most efficient production method, 
because their decisions would be mainly based 
on market conditions, since capital is not the 
base for consumption taxes (James, 2015). 
Finally, consumption taxes could encourage 
economic growth through their neutrality toward 
decisions related to the supply of labor. Under an 
income tax, progressive tax rates might distort 
the incentives to increase the hours worked, 
since the additional income will be taxed at a 
higher rate. In this case, a shift toward consump-
tion taxes might be unlikely to affect workers’ 
decisions as to whether or not to increase their 
working hours, since they would only have to 
pay taxes when they spend their income on 
consumption – not on the additional hours 
worked. Hence a shift toward consumption taxes 
could boost economic growth through its effect 
on increases in the hours worked (OECD, 2007). 
The values of adjusted R-squared of the 
three model specifications show that the model 
which shifts the burden of revenue toward 
consumption taxes may have a more reliable 
relationship with economic growth. In general, 
however, the modest fit of the model specifi-
cations in columns (1) to (3) might indicate that 
more explanatory variables are needed to be 
examined. For this reason, robustness checks 
might be necessary and the next section ex-
amines the degree of sensitivity of the empirical 
results to changes in regression specifications. 
As one tax instrument is omitted at a time 
and two others evaluated, there may be more 
combinations than the regressions presented in 
Table 1. Confidence in the results found in the 
previous section could nonetheless be increased 
when the choice of a particular regression set-up 
is not central to the finding of positive effects of 
consumption taxes on economic performance. 
Other than taxes, previous studies have 
suggested that economic growth is driven by 
several other variables (see Isaksson, 2007).  
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To measure the robustness of the findings, 
these other variables could be introduced into the 
regression’s specifications. However, the 
algorithm would simply not converge if too 
many explanatory variables are involved. For 
this reason, only two instruments of tax will be 
considered in these robustness checks: taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains and taxes on 
goods and services. The other reason is that 
these two tax instruments are the major sources 
of revenues for the Indonesian government.6 
In this study, the variables added for the 
purposes of robustness checks are the rate of 
growth of trade openness, financial system, 
electricity production, and inflation. The 
justification for adding trade openness in the 
robustness tests is that the level of openness 
could spur positive spillover effects in 
technological advances, from countries or firms 
with higher levels of technological knowledge to 
countries or firms with lower levels of 
technological knowledge (Comin & Hobijn, 
2004). The argument for including the variable 
of the financial system in the robustness tests is 
that the level of the financial system’s 
development would affect the efficient allocation 
of resources in an economy. A good financial 
system would enable the allocation of savings to 
high-quality investments in economic sectors 
which provide the highest returns relative to 
other sectors, and the rate of growth of 
technological progress could be stimulated by 
these high-quality investments (Fisman & Love, 
2003). Electricity production, whether it is the 
result of investment by the government or by 
firms, is essential for an economy to grow, since 
the degree of adoption of current technology 
may depend on the availability of electricity 
(Aschauer, 1989; Comin & Hobijn, 2004). 
                                                 
6 For the period 2010-2015 income tax and value added tax, 
on average, cover around 61% of total central government 
revenue (Bank Indonesia, 2017). 
Finally, the justification for including inflation 
as one of the variables in the robustness tests is 
that the level of inflation may capture the 
government’s consistencies in maintaining 
responsible monetary and fiscal policies. This is 
because large, structural fiscal imbalances could 
result in debt monetization and higher inflation 
rates, that adversely affect economic growth 
(Easterly & Levine, 2003). 
Data on international trade are collected 
from the World Development Indicators and are 
employed as a proxy for trade openness. These 
data comprise of the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services, measured as a share of 
GDP. Data on the values of domestic credit 
provided by the financial sector, as a share of 
GDP, are used as proxies for the level of 
development of the financial system and 
collected from the World Development 
Indicators. Data on electricity production are 
also compiled from the World Development 
Indicators. This dataset consists of the 
production of power plants and combined heat 
and power plant less transmission, distribution, 
and transformation losses, and own use by heat 
and power plants. Data on inflation, measured by 
the consumer price index, are also from the 
World Development Indicators. All data cover 
the period 1984-2015, and nominal values are 
measured at constant 2010 prices. Table 2 
presents the results for the robustness tests. 
Analyses on the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) of the independent variables presented in 
tables 1 and 2 show magnitudes ranged between 
1.0 and 6.4 (the statistical results are shown in 
Appendix 3). Although Kutner, Nachtsheim, and 
Neter (2004) argued that a VIF of more than 10 
is generally considered high, however, these 
magnitudes may show that there exists some 
degree of multicollinearity between the indepen-
dent variables in the models employed in this 
study, which may affect the regression results. 2 
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In Table 2, interpretations for the coeffi-
cients of the independent variables of physical 
capital; human capital; population; overall tax 
burden; taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains; and taxes on goods and services are the 
same as discussed previously regarding these 
same coefficients in Table 1 – only their 
magnitude may be different. One should be 
cautious, however, in interpreting the results 
related to the negative coefficients presented in 
Table 2. 
Overall, the robustness tests presented in 
Table 2 do not seem to confirm the previous 
findings that income taxes do not have a 
significant effect on economic growth, and 
consumption taxes significantly affect economic 
growth. These previous findings are not robust 
when additional factors are included as control 
variables.7 The variable of trade openness is 
included as a control variable in columns (1) and 
(2). In these two columns, the mix of income 
taxes and consumption taxes do not seem to 
have a statistically significant impact on long-
run GDP growth. Careful measures should be 
exercised, however, in interpreting the negative 
coefficient for the independent variable of trade 
openness in these specifications. It might be 
incorrect to interpret that the negative coefficient 
would mean that a higher share of exports and 
imports in GDP would reduce economic growth; 
thus alternative explanations on the relationship 
between trade openness and economic growth – 
which is beyond the scope of this study – may 
need to be explored further. 
In columns (3) and (4) the maturity of the 
financial system is included as a control 
variable. A coefficient of 0.00 for the 
independent variable of the financial system 
could be interpreted that a 1% change in the 
                                                 
7  Only when the financial system is included in the 
specification does the result confirm the previous result 
that only consumption tax affects growth. 
share of domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector in the economy might change the 
rate of GDP growth by 0.00%. In these 
specifications, it is only consumption taxes 
which show a significant effect on GDP growth. 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon 
could be that the more mature an economy’s 
financial system is, the higher would be the 
consumption in that economy. A well-developed 
financial system may ease the liquidity 
constraints facing households, thus raising the 
level of consumption through a rapid expansion 
of credit (Boone, Girouard, & Wanner, 2001). In 
an economy where the financial market is 
heavily regulated, households may face limits on 
their ability to borrow due to, for example, low 
credit limits and high-interest rates. This credit 
constraint would adversely affect the level of 
households’ consumption. On the other hand, in 
an economy with liberalization and deregulation 
of the financial market, relatively higher credit 
limits and lower interest rates may ease the 
borrowing constraints faced by households, 
leaving them with more ability to borrow against 
their future income to finance current 
consumption, and thus lead to higher overall 
consumption. This higher level of consumption 
may boost economic growth as well as 
government revenue from consumption taxes. 
Columns (5) and (6) add electricity produc-
tion into the regression equations and found that 
both income tax and consumption tax do not 
have a statistically significant impact on 
economic growth. The interpretation for the 
coefficient of the independent variable of 
electricity production is as follows: a 1% change 
in the output of power plants might change the 
rate of GDP growth by 0.10% in Column (5) and 
by 0.09% in Column (6). 
Both the coefficients of income taxes and 
consumption taxes become positive and 
significant once inflation is introduced into the 
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equations, as shown in columns (7) and (8). The 
coefficient of the independent variable of 
inflation might suggest that a 1% increase in the 
level of inflation (measured by the consumer 
price index) could change the rate of GDPs 
growth by 0.00%. The significant effect of 
income taxes when inflation is added in these 
specifications might show the possible decreases 
in the progressivity of Indonesia’s income tax 
system, relative to inflation. Significant 
additional tax burdens could arise if income 
taxes are not adjusted frequently for inflation 
(Immervoll, 2000).  
Hence, it could be inferred that the lack of 
robust evidence on the effects of tax structures 
(i.e., the mix between income taxes and 
consumption taxes) on economic growth seems 
to confirm the ‘super-neutrality conjecture’ 
suggested by Harberger more than 50 years ago. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the relation between tax 
structures and economic growth for the case of 
Indonesia, over the period 1984-2015, by 
combining the frameworks of neoclassical and 
endogenous growth models. Empirical results in 
this paper found that income tax does not exert 
any significant effect on economic growth, while 
consumption tax has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on growth. However, these 
results are not robust to changes in the 
regression’s specifications. Hence, although 
theory predicts that the mix of direct and indirect 
taxes may be an important determinant of long-
run economic growth, this paper provides 
evidence in support of the claim of Harberger 
(1964a, 1964b) that, in practice, this mix may be 
unlikely to affect long-run economic growth. 
The finding of the lack of a robust relation 
between tax structures and economic growth in 
this paper is also consistent with other empirical 
studies conducted by Acosta Ormaechea and 
Yoo (2012); Madsen and Damania (1996); 
Mendoza et al. (1997); Poterba et al. (1986). 
However, this finding is inconsistent with the 
studies by (Arnold et al., 2011); Johansson et al. 
(2008); Kneller et al. (1999); Vartia (2008); 
Widmalm (2001). 
Nonetheless, the finding in this paper does 
not necessarily imply that efforts to reform the 
tax system are pointless, since economic growth 
may not be the only objective of tax reform. Tax 
policy design may also be influenced by the 
distributional effects of different tax instruments 
(its analysis, however, is beyond the scope of 
this paper). Hence, although the effects of tax 
structures on economic growth may be minimal, 
the distributional effects of different taxes could 
be politically desirable as one of the goals of tax 
reform. Further, tax reform may also be aimed at 
improving the tax system’s administration since, 
as Bird (2004) maintained, even the best tax 
policy would be of little use if it cannot be 
implemented effectively. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Regardless of whether or not tax reform 
envisages changes to the overall level of the tax 
burden, identifying the effects of different tax 
instruments on economic growth may be 
important for policy design. This identification is 
particularly useful when the government 
considers reforming the existing tax structure, in 
order to minimize the adverse impacts of 
taxation on economic growth, while maintaining 
the capacity of the government to finance the 
desired level of provision of public goods and 
services. 
The finding in this study suggests that there 
is a lack of evidence on the effects of the mix 
between income taxes and consumption taxes on 
Indonesia’s long-run economic growth. Hence, 
policymakers could instead focus their attention 
to directing tax reform toward improving the tax 
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system’s administration; such as simplifying the 
tax systems, building trust between taxpayers 
and tax officials, giving fairer and professional 
treatment to taxpayers, and facilitating 
compliance. Another direction for tax reform 
could also be focused on improving the equity of 
the tax system. 
One of the limitations of this study, however, 
is that it does not measure the growth rate of 
technological progress in the economy; as the 
model assumes technological progress to be 
purely exogenous and merely a function of time. 
Hence, further research could be directed toward 
including the level of technological progress in 
the model. Another limitation of this study 
relates to the choice of tax instruments examined 
in the model. In this case, a further study could 
expand the model to include the effects of 
property taxes – particularly recurrent taxes on 
immovable property – on economic growth. The 
limited sample of data, due to the reason of 
availability, may also serve as one of the 
limitations of this paper; thus further study may 
be needed when more data are available. 
Other avenues of approach for further study 
might involve offering a quadratic model. 
However, one should be careful in treating the 
independent variables of taxes (income taxes, 
goods and services taxes, and international trade 
taxes) in the model. This is because taxes may 
negatively affect economic growth; thus it might 
not be appropriate to treat them as quadratic 
variables since doing so may obscure the 
possibility of the negative effects of taxes in the 
regression’s results.  
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Appendix 3. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Independent  
Variable 
Table 1 Table 2 
Model 
 1 
Model 
 2 
Model 
 3 
Model
 1 
Model
 2 
Model
 3 
Model
 4 
Model
 5 
Model 
 6 
Model 
 7 
Model
 8 
Capital 1.066 1.095 1.041 1.070 1.095 1.070 1.116 1.146 1.225 1.312 1.397 
Human 4.018 4.022 4.022 4.258 4.264 4.309 4.335 4.052 4.067 4.047 4.048 
Population 4.056 4.054 4.056 4.325 4.368 5.502 5.523 6.341 6.452 4.063 4.058 
AllTax 1.337 1.034 1.047 1.343 1.045 1.448 1.095 1.347 1.047 1.554 1.125 
IncTax 1.326   1.326  1.352  1.328  1.424  
ConsTax  1.091   1.192  1.131  1.176  1.095 
TradeTax   1.031         
Openness    1.085 1.186       
Financial      1.756 1.787     
Electricity        2.898 3.120   
Inflation          1.522 1.422 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
